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I. Introduction
Addressing Ronald Dworkin's work and assessing his legacy are the main aims of this paper. Let me point out in advance that in my opinion he is the greatest legal philosopher and theorist ever and is among the most influential moral and political philosopher of our time. In a few words, he developed an original legal theory with its distinctive methodology, which not only has transcended the Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law into a branch of political morality and defended as a corollary the one right answer thesis.
As advanced in the "Introduction" to his celebrated Taking Rights Seriously he aimed to "define and defend a liberal theory of law" by being sharply critical of another theory widely thought to be liberal, i.e. the "ruling theory of law", which "has two parts and insists on their independence". The first part is a "theory about what law is", i.e. "the theory of legal positivism, which holds that the truth of legal propositions consists in facts about rules that have been adopted by specific social institutions, and in nothing else." The second is a "theory about what the law ought to be", i.e. "the theory of utilitarianism, which holds that law and its institutions should serve the general welfare, and nothing else." 1 Contrary to the insistence about the independence of both parts, he claims: "A general theory of law must be normative as well as conceptual." 2 Bear in mind that this claim will allow Dworkin to collapse the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive: 3 Its normative part must treat a variety of topics indicated by the following catalogue. It must have a theory of legislation, of adjudication, and of compliance; these three theories look at the normative questions of law from the standpoint of a lawmaker, a judge, and an ordinary citizen. The theory of legislation must contain a theory of legitimacy, which describes the circumstances under which a particular person or group is entitled to make law, and a theory of legislative justice, which describes the law they are entitled or obliged to make. The theory of adjudication must also be complex: it must contain a theory of controversy, which sets out standards that judges should use to decide hard cases at law, and a theory of jurisdiction, which explains why and when judges, rather than other groups or institutions, should make the decisions required by the theory of controversy. The theory of compliance must contrast and discuss two roles. It must contain a theory of deference, which discusses the nature and limits of the citizen's duty to obey the law in different forms of state, and under different circumstances, and a theory of enforcement, which identifies the goals of enforcement and punishment, and describes how official should respond to different categories of crime or fault.
In a few words, he connects or even --as I will argue--integrates both parts, i.e. the normative and the conceptual, not only within a general theory of law but also with other departments of philosophy. In his own voice: 4
The interdependencies of the various parts of a general theory of law are therefore complex. In the same way, moreover, a general theory of law will have many connections with other departments of philosophy. The normative theory will be embedded in a more general political and moral philosophy which may in turn depend upon philosophical theories about human nature or the objectivity of morality. The conceptual part will draw upon the philosophy of language and therefore upon logic and metaphysics… A general theory of law must therefore constantly take up one or another disputed position on problems of philosophy that are not distinctly legal.
In short, Dworkin's powerful critique of law as a model or system of rules and of legal positivism as a form of legal conventionalism, as well as his conception of law as constructive interpretation, as a chain novel, as integrity, as an interpretive concept, and as a branch of political morality, among many other features of his theory, challenged not only the then clearly dominant legal theory but also its methodology, which claims to be general and descriptive or even indirectly evaluative but still morally neutral. 5 Hence, after identifying Dworkin's challenge, including the existence of persistent and pervasive disagreements within the different legal theories that 4 ibid viii-ix 5 See for the early version Ronald Dworkin, 'The Model of Rules ' (1967) 35 U of Chi L Rev arguably describe the same phenomenon, 6 but that actually prescribe a different solution to it, I intend: in section II, to introduce some basic definitions and distinctions between jurisprudence, legal philosophy (or philosophy of law) and legal theory (or theory of law), on one side, and its relationship to methodology, on the other; in section III, to point out the main methodologies available to legal theories; in section IV, to revisit Dworkin's model; and, finally, in section V, to conclude by briefly reconsidering the one right answer thesis.
II. Definitions and Distinctions
The aim of this section is: first, to introduce some basic definitions and distinctions between "jurisprudence", "legal philosophy" or "philosophy of law", and "legal theory" or "theory of law"; and, second, to point out their relations to the so-called "legal methodology" (or "methodology", for short). Although the terms "jurisprudence", "legal philosophy" or "philosophy of law", and "legal theory" are used more or less interchangeably, I will like to point out that the different labels are helpful in order to figure out the underlying "methodology", including its scientific, philosophical and theoretical presumptions and presuppositions. 7
Since Roman times, following the famous definitions, placed in a passage at the beginning of the Digest of Justinian, by Ulpian "Iurisprudentia est divinarum atque rerum notitia, iusti atque injusti scientia" (i.e. "Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human; the science of the just and unjust"), and by Celso "Ius est ars boni et aequi" (i.e. "Law is the art of the good and fair"), with the science of what ought to be." 9 Nevertheless, the word "jurisprudence" is used to refer to a science (or part of it), as well as to the scientific knowledge of "law".
Whereas the expressions "legal philosophy" or "philosophy of law" by using the word "philosophy" suggest that the distinctive knowledge (or at least the method) is not scientific per se but philosophical, irrespective of whether there is a close or not relationship between science and philosophy, following the adagio: "philosophy is the mother of all sciences". The fact that both 8 John Austin uses this passage from the Roman jurists as an example of the "2 nd .Tendency to confound positive law with positive morality, and both with legislation and deontology" but nevertheless affirms: "jurisprudence… is the science of law", see 'The Province Though I am absolutely convinced that Hart sold analytic or linguistic philosophy to lawyers, he did still used the terms more or less interchangeably, but certainly with a clear and distinctive philosophical emphasis. 11 In that sense, I am not completely persuaded that the usage of "jurisprudence" is reserved for law schools or lawyers (or jurists) and "legal philosophy" or "philosophy of law" for philosophy departments or philosophers. 12 From my point of view the relevant distinction is whether "jurisprudence" and "legal philosophy" or "philosophy of law" is done by lawyers (or jurists) or by philosophers. Ideally, it should be done both by lawyers (or jurists) with a philosophical background and by philosophers with a legal one.
Finally, the terms "legal theory", "theory of law" and even "theory about law" are much more broader by encompassing not only "jurisprudence" and "legal philosophy" or "philosophy of law" but also theorizing from a variety of other perspectives, including "law and economics", "law and politics", "law and 12 cf Solum (n 7) affirming that Hart "had a dominant influence in defining the content of courses on philosophy of law in philosophy departments and jurisprudence in law schools" literature", "law and society", as well as critical approaches, and so on. 13 To the extent, that Solum affirms that "legal theory" is "currently the best neutral term for referring to legal theorizing, broadly understood." 14 Nonetheless, since there is not a one and only method of theorizing about law, let me suggest that there are several methodologies and hence legal theories.
III. Legal Theories and Methodologies
Let me start this section by quoting H.L.A. Hart's clarification of the aims of his legal theory and its basic methodological presumptions and presuppositions in the "Postscript" to The Concept of Law: 15 My aim in this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is both general and descriptive. It is general in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal system or legal culture, but seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying account of law as a complex social and political institution with a rule-governed (and in that sense 'normative') aspect… My account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in my general account of law, though a clear understanding of these is, I think, an important preliminary to any useful moral criticism of law.
At the outset of the clarification, we can identify two basic methodological distinctions as applied to legal theories:
1) The distinction between general legal theories that respond to nothing precludes a more comprehensive legal theory that includes more than one quadrant and that correspond to four additional possibilities combining:
(1) and (2); (3) and (4); (1) and (3); and (2) and (4); and, even a much more comprehensive theory that integrates the four quadrants and a further possibility combining: (1), (2), (3), and (4). 18
Descriptive / Explanatory Normative / Justificatory General (1)
18 Let me advance that for the purposes of this paper, I am especially interested in the possibility of connecting (1) "general descriptive / explanatory legal theory" and (2) "general normative / justificatory legal theory", on the one hand, and (3) "particular descriptive / explanatory legal theory" and (4) "particular normative / justificatory legal theory", on the other hand, and even the possibility of contrasting (1) and (3), on one side, and (2) and (4), on the other. The only two options that I do not consider feasible because they will turn out to be logically fallacious are connecting: (1) and (4); and (2) and (3); and, hence, they are completely ruled out.
Particular
(3) (4)
Traditionally, natural law theories do accept and even embrace the normative dimension to the extent that they appear to be clearly justificatory,
whereas positive law theories reject it by claiming to remain (purely or solely) descriptive, to the extent that they are explanatory.
On the one hand, additionally to Hart, John Austin and Hans Kelsen as well as other positive law theorists, i.e. legal positivists, are representative of (1). For example, Austin famously appealed: "The existence of law is one thing;
its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or not be is one enquiry; whether it be or nor be conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation." 19 Analogously, Kelsen --at the beginning of both editions of his Reine Rechstlehre--asserted: 20
The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law. It is a theory of positive law in general, not of a specific legal order. It is a general theory of law, not an interpretation of specific national or international legal norms; but it offers a theory of interpretation.
As a theory, its exclusive purpose is to know and to describe its object. On the other hand, certainly Saint Augustine of Hippo and other classical natural law theorists are representative of (2) since they appear to hold that the normative exhausts the content and nature of the law or alternately that the law is reduced to the prescriptive to the extent that "iniustia lex, non est lex", i.e. "unjust law is not law at all". 21
As already advanced, I am especially interested in the possibility of connecting (1) and (2), on the one hand, and (3) and (4), on the other hand, and even the possibility of contrasting (1) and (3), on one side, and (2) and (4) (2). 22 However, in the remainder of this section, we will bracket the former possibility and will focus on the latter possibility, i.e. the connection or not between (1) and (2).
In that sense, most legal positivists --following Austin, Kelsen and Hart-have insisted in the independence between (1) and (2) and have been claiming to be committed exclusively to (1) and so have been labeled as "hard" or "exclusive legal positivists". Similarly, even those that admit that there are contingent relationships between (1) and (2) seem to subordinate (2) to (1), due to the fact that it is the law, which includes or incorporates references to morality, 25 and even can be reduced accordingly to a mere or pure conceptual analysis without normative / justificatory aims, 26 and so have been labeled as "soft", "inclusive legal positivists" or "incorporationists". Moreover, some legal positivists have conceded to different extent by recognizing the possibility 27 and even the necessity 28 of connecting both (1) and (2). Finally, some natural law theorists, following Saint Thomas Aquinas dictum "Non lex, sed legis corruptio" 29 seem to be adopting a form of weak natural law theory that connects both (1) and (2). (1), (2), (3) and (4) into a much more complex legal framework by combining the different possibilities or more precisely by blurring the lines dividing them. 30 Keep in mind that Dworkin not only blurs the lines diving the different possibilities, i.e. general and particular, descriptive / explanatory and normative / justificatory but also collapses the distinctions between creation and application, between legislation and adjudication, and most notably between theory and practice. For example, in Law's Empire, Dworkin affirms:
on one side, "Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law"; 31 and, on the other, "Interpretative theories are by their nature addressed to a particular legal culture, generally the culture to which their authors belong". 32
(1)
(3) Hedgehogs, 34 Dworkin distanced himself from a "natural" model and endorsed a "constructive" one. The "natural" model presupposes a philosophical position that describes an objective moral reality, which is not created by human beings, but rather discovered by them, as the laws of physics: "Moral reasoning or philosophy is a process of reconstructing the fundamental principles by assembling concrete judgments in the right order, as a natural historian reconstructs the shape of the whole animal from the fragments of its bones that he has found." 35 On the contrary, the "constructive" model "treats intuitions of justice not as clues to the existence of independent principles, but rather as stipulated features of a general theory to be constructed, as if the sculptor set himself to carve the animal that best fits a pile of bones he happened to find together". 36 In his own voice: 37
This 'constructive' model does not assume, as the natural model does, that principles of justice have some fixed, objective existence, so that descriptions of these principles must be true or false in some standard way. It does not assume that the animal it matches to the bones actually exists. It makes the different, and in some ways more complex, assumption that men and women have a responsibility to fit the particular 33 39 Dworkin reinforces not only that the model is constructive and to some extent creative but clarifies that it is not inventive but interpretive of the practice. In other words, since law is an "interpretive concept" the proper method requires a "constructive interpretation" of the practice. In that sense, on one side, Dworkin is adamant in his criticism of "semantic theories of law", which he labels as "the semantic sting", because they appear to consider the concept of law as a "criterial concept" 40 and even a "natural kind concept" 41 with necessary and sufficient conditions, whereas it is an "interpretive concept". 42 And, on the other, firstly, defines: "constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the First, there must be a "preinterpretive" stage in which the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of the practice are identified… Second, there must be an interpretive stage at which the interpreter settles on some general justification for the main elements of the practice identified at the preinterpretive stage… Finally, there must be a postinterpretive or reforming stage, at which he adjusts his sense of what the practice "really" requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts at the interpretive stage.
And, thirdly, insists that its nature is interpretive rather than inventive:
"The justification need not fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice, but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one." 45 c) Evaluative. Although in "How Law is Like Literature" Dworkin seemed to diminish the evaluative as well as the descriptive in the process of emphasizing the interpretative, at the end it was clear that he has been endorsing a moral reading of the practice, which requires references to value 43 Dworkin, Law's Empire (n 5) 52; see ibid 90: "constructive interpretations… try to show legal practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justification of that practice." In that sense, Dworkin's interpretive model is not merely applicative but argumentative as well, see Imer B Flores, '¿Es el derecho un modelo aplicativo?' in Juan Federico Arriola Cantero and Víctor Rojas Amandi (eds), La filosofía del derecho hoy (Porrúa 2010) and even value judgments that are not subjective but objective. 46 On the one hand, Dworkin affirmed: "propositions of law are not merely descriptive of legal history, in a straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way divorced from legal history. They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description and evaluation but is different from both." 47 On the other hand, he clarified (with the "rules of courtesy" as example) that the "interpretive attitude" has two components, i.e. an assumption that it has an objective value (or point) and a further assumption that it is sensitive to it. In Dworkin's voice: 48
The first is the assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist but has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle --in short, that it has some point--that can be stated independently of just describing the rules that make up that the practice. The second is the further assumption that the requirements of courtesy --the behavior it calls for or judgments it warrants--are not necessarily or exclusively what they have always been taken to be but are instead sensitive to its point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied or extended or modified or qualified or limited by that point. Once this interpretive attitude takes hold, the institution of courtesy ceases to be mechanical; it is no longer unstudied deference to a runic order. People now try to impose meaning on the institution --to see its best light-and then to restructure it in the light of that meaning. flow from past decisions and so count as legal, not just when they are explicit in these decisions but also when they follow from the principles of personal and political morality the explicit decisions presuppose by way of justification"; see also ibid, 176-224 and 225-75, especially 176: "We have two principles of political integrity: a legislative principle, which asks law makers to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent, and an adjudicative principle, which instructs that the law be seen as coherent in that way, so far as possible" (emphasis added); ibid 225: "Law as integrity denies that statements of law are either the backwardlooking factual reports of conventionalism or the forward-looking instrumental programs of legal pragmatism. It insists that legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefore combine backward-and forward-looking elements; they interpret contemporary legal practice seen as an unfolding political narrative. So law as integrity rejects as unhelpful the ancient question whether judges find or invent law; we understand legal reasoning, it suggests, only by seeing the sense in which they do both and neither"; and, ibid 406: "We hope that our legislature will recognize what justice requires so that no practical conflict remains between justice and legislative supremacy; we hope that departments of law will be rearranged, in professional and public understanding, to map true distinctions of principle, so that local priority presents no impediment to a judge seeking a natural flow of principle throughout the law. When more than forty years ago I first tried to defend interpretivism, I defended it within this orthodox two-systems picture. I assumed that law and morals are different systems of norms and that the crucial question is how to they interact. So I said… that the law includes not just enacted rules, or rules with pedigree, but justifying principles as well. I soon came to think, however, that the two-systems picture of the problem was itself flawed, and I began to approach the issue through a very different picture. I did not fully appreciate the nature of that picture, however, or how different it is from the orthodox model, until I began to consider the larger issues of this book.
So instead of considering law and morality as two separate systems, Dworkin has replaced it with a one-system picture, which now treats "law as a part of political morality" and recalled the aim of the book: To say that someone has a 'legal obligation' is to say that his case falls under a valid legal rule that requires him to do or to forbear form doing something. (To say he has a legal right, or has a legal power of some sort, or a legal privilege or immunity, is to assert, in a shorthand way, that other have an actual or hypothetical legal obligations to act or not to act in certain ways touching him.) In the absence of such a valid legal rule there is no legal obligation; it follows that when the judge decides an issue by exercising his discretion, he is not enforcing a legal right as to that issue.
According to this criticism, the judge that excercises discretion in hard cases is not applying the already existing law but acting as if he was the legislator to the extent of either creating new law or changing the existing one and what is even worse he is doing it ex post facto, which amounts to a violation of concrete principles such as the division or separation of powers and the irretroactivity of the law and more abstract principles such as certainty, generality, legality, and normativity. On the contrary, Dworkin claims not only that the judge by appealing to the underlying justifying principles will still be applying already existing law without having to create new law or to change the 62 ibid; see Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) 34-5: "We might treat law not as separate from but as a department of morality. We understand political theory that way: as part of morality more generally understood but distinguished, with its own distinct substance, because applicable to distinct institutional structures. We might treat legal theory as a special part of political morality distinguished by a further refinement of institutional structures." 63 Dworkin (n 1) 17 existing one but also that there is and even must be one right answer to every legal question.
In the process of defending the one right answer thesis, 64 on the one hand, in the center of "Hard Cases", Dworkin constructs an imaginary judge What's more, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin distinguished between indeterminacy and uncertainty: "But in all these aspects indeterminacy differs from uncertainty. "I am uncertain whether the proposition in question is true or false" is plainly consistent with "It is one or the other," but "The proposition in question is neither true nor false" is not." 70
In a few words, Dworkin by differentiating indeterminacy from uncertainty, as he previously did by constructing Hercules, is able to separate the lack of certainty, i.e. a final demonstration or proof, from the claim for determinacy, i.e. a preexisting one right answer for every legal question being already somehow "out there".
Let me clarify that "out there" in Dworkin's model means that the answer is, on the one hand, not to be discovered (or deducted) but to be constructed, from the already preexisting legal materials; and, on the other hand, not to be invented (or created and even changed) but to be interpreted (and even argued for), again from the already preexisting legal materials. Similarly, the one right answer thesis can be constructed and interpreted from the already preexisting legal materials because it can be evaluated from the underlying principles, including moral ones, which are not only objective and justify the practice but also integrated into law. Finally, against the critique that the preexisting legal materials may appear to be contradictory and even incommensurable, Dworkin provides an interpretation following his unity of value thesis that reconciles values by showing that moral conflict requires a deeper form of collaboration to solve the apparent conflict and even to figure out a point of comparison or contrast, to the extent that somehow the one right answer will despite all still be available in very crazy cases. 71 For that purpose Dworkin develops a variation of the drowning swimmer case, in which he first poses the problem and later reflects upon it: 72
One person clings to a life preserver in a storm that has wrecked her boat; sharks circle her. Two other passengers cling to another life preserver a hundred yards away; sharks circle them as well. You have a boat on shore. You can reach one life preserver in time, but then not the other one. Assuming all three are strangers, do you have a duty to save the two swimmers and let the lone swimmer die?
[…]
But if we approach the decision in another way --by concentrating not on consequences but on rights--it is far from plain that we should automatically save the greater number. We might think that each victim has an equal antecedent right to be saved, and we might therefore be tempted by a lottery in which each shipwreck victim has at least one-third chance to be saved. (The sharks agree to circle while the lottery is conducted.)
In sum, although most people will appear to be automatically inclined to save two, due to the bare fact that they are more than one, it is far from clear that that is a right answer. Actually, saving the greater number may seem to be the right answer from a consequentialist approach, but not according to a 71 See Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 120; see also principles and rights conception, in which each victim has an equal antecedent right to be saved and must be treated with equal concern and respect, as 
